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THE SPECTER OF A LESBIAN SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE: PROBLEMS OF IDENTITY IN
LESBIAN LEGAL THEORIZING
RuTHANN ROBSON*
INTRODUCTION
"To start with, we need a lesbian on the Supreme Court."'
It was the summer of 1992, the last summer of the Reagan-Bush
regime, although the demise of that era was far from certain. I was
being interviewed by a gay and lesbian magazine for a feature article
about the Supreme Court. I was staying in Provincetown, a place re-
nowned for its lesbian/gay culture, surrounded by lesbians of every ilk.
My opinion was solicited as a constitutional scholar and expert on
lesbian legal issues and theories.2 While lesbians appear in periodicals,
on the streets, and in legal theories, 3 not one lesbian has appeared as a
United States Supreme Court Justice, ever. So, when the interviewer
* Associate Professor of Law, City University of New York School of Law.
The author wishes to express her appreciation to S.E. Valentine and Joyce McConnell, as well
as to the CUNY community for continued support for the development of lesbian legal theories. For
specific assistance with this article, the author thanks her research assistant Leslie Thrope, student
assistant Maria Schopp, and librarian Ricardo Pla. Sherrie Cohen, Senior Articles Editor of the St.
Thomas Law Review, is also appreciated for her efforts to include lesbian perspectives with con-
ceptions of emerging jurisprudence, as well as her patience and efforts on this article.
1. Andrew Patner, Supreme Injustices, ADVOCATE, Sept. 8, 1992, at 32, 38 (quoting
Ruthann Robson).
2. RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OuT)LAw: SURVIVAL UNDER TuE RULE OF LAW (1992)
[hereinafter ROBSON, (OT)LAw]; Ruthann Robson, Posner's Lesbians: Neither Sexy Nor Rea-
sonable, 25 CONN. L. REV. 491 (1993) [hereinafter Robson, Posner's Lesbians]; Ruthann
Robson, Incendiary Categories: Lesbian/Violence/Law, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 1 (1992) [herein-
after Robson, Incendiary Categories]; Ruthann Robson, Embodiment(s): The Possibilities of
Lesbian Legal Theory in Bodies Problematized by Postmodernisms and Feminisms, 2 LAW &
SEXUAUTY: REV. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 37 (1992) [hereinafter Robson, Embodi-
ment(s)]; Ruthann Robson, Lesbianism in Anglo-European Legal History, 5 WIS. WOMEN'S LJ.
1 (1990); Ruthann Robson, Lesbian Jurisprudence?, 8 LAW & INEO. J. 443 (1990); Ruthann
Robson, Lavender Bruises: Intra-Lesbian Violence, Law & Lesbian Legal Theory, 20 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 567 (1990); Ruthann Robson, Lifting Belly: Privacy, Sexuality & Lesbianism,
12 WOMEN'S Ris. L. REP. 177 (1990); Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians
as Intimate Partners and Lesbian Legal Theory, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 511 (1990).
3. I do not mean to imply that there is even a minimal level of satisfactory lesbian
visibility, in publishing, public life, or jurisprudence. Part of the lesbian project remains articu-
lating our existence, to ourselves, to each other, and to non-lesbians.
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asked me a general question about changing the United States Supreme
Court, I replied that we should start with the appointment of a lesbian.
My proposal, glib as a Provincetown summer, implicitly asserts
lesbianism would be a relevant quality of a United States Supreme
Court Justice. More explicitly, I presupposed a lesbian United States
Supreme Court Justice would, by virtue of her lesbianism, possess cer-
tain judicial philosophies and political positions. For example, she
would not be a strict constructionist who relied upon the original fram-
ers of the Constitution as her touchstones. As a lesbian, she would be
aware that none of the original framers were lesbians, or even women;
she would not be bound by world views that excluded her and her
lovers. Further, as a lesbian she would believe that Bowers v.
Hardwick was wrongly decided, since she would believe her own sex-
uality deserved constitutional protection.6 Also as a lesbian, although
perhaps more tenuously related to her lesbianism, I assumed she would
uphold privacy doctrine generally, including abortion rights for all
women;7 she would give an expansive reading to the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, not only to include lesbians as
lesbians, but to include all lesbians, even if the categories at issue were
racial, religious, bodily, gender, sexual, or cultural;8 she would declare
capital punishment unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment;9 she
would resurrect the rights of criminal defendants;"° she would under-
4. For a discussion of strict constructionism and original intent in constitutional inter-
pretation, see generally Raoul Berger, "Original Intent": A Response to Hans Baade, 70 TEX.
L Ray. 1535 (1992); Boris I. Bittker, The Bicentennial of the Jurisprudence of Original Intent:
The Recent Past, 77 CAL. L. REV. 235 (1989); Daniel Farber, The Originalism Debate: A
Guide for the Perplxea 49 OHIO ST. LJ. 1085 (1989); H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L REv. 885 (1985).
5. 478 U.S. 186, reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039 (1986).
6. In Hardwick, the Court rejected a constitutional challenge to a Georgia statute
criminalizing oral/anal sex, generically known as a sodomy statute. The extent to which such
statutes actually encompass lesbian sexuality is problematic, although lesbians have been prose-
cuted under such statutes. See generally ROBSON, (OUTr)LAw, supra note 2, at 47-71.
7. For the precarious state of constitutional protection for women's abortion rights, see
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992); see also Bray v. Alexandria Women's
Health Clinic, 113 S. Ct. 753 (1993) (holding that disfavor or opposition to abortion does not
amount to discrimination against women as a class).
8. See infra notes 90-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of equal protection.
9. For the present state of the Supreme Court's capital punishment jurisprudence, see
Herrera v. Collins, 113 S. Ct. 853 (1993) (holding that a claim of proof of innocence does not
warrant a stay of execution).
10. For recent Supreme Court decisions adversely affecting criminal defendants' rights, see
United States v. Dunnigan, 113 S. Ct. 1111 (1993) (right to testify); United States v. Nachtigal,
113 S. Ct. 1072 (1993) (right to jury trial); Wright v. West, 112 S. Ct. 2482 (1992) (right to
due process).
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stand the importance of free speech, but it would not be her shibboleth
in this nation of disparate access to speech." Given the current com-
position of the United States Supreme Court, she would be writing an
excessive number of dissenting opinions.
The specter of a lesbian Supreme Court Justice raises an issue that
has troubled lesbian and political theory, the issue of identity politics.
Any invocation of identity, political or otherwise, provokes post-
modernist apprehension, an apprehension that has been particularly
potent in sexual identities. Also as a sexual identity, lesbian identity
evokes other postmodernist-influenced issues. Particularly problematic
are lesbian identity's unintelligibility until claimed or avowed and lesbi-
an identity's uncertain classification as an identity status or a sexual
act. This Article will interrogate the predicaments posed by identity
politics, including postmodernist questionings of identity and the identi-
ty/activity dichotomy, concluding with some opinions about the necessi-
ty for a lesbian Supreme Court Justice.
IDENTITY POLITICS
A suggestion that a lesbian should serve as a Justice on the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court rests on a foundation of identity politics.
Identity politics posits a relationship between one's identity, in this case
identity as a lesbian, and one's politics, in this case progressive politics.
The underlying assumption of identity politics is that given a social
structure that is cognizant of group identities (such as sexuality, gender,
and race), one's identities will shape one's experiences, which in turn
will influence one's thinking, including one's politics. This, in and of
itself, seems hardly arguable, unless one wants to argue that experience
and thought are totally disconnected. Much more arguable is the more
insidious assumption that identities and politics are consistently related
in a particular pattern; the conventional configuration is that one's ex-
perience of oppression produces an emancipatory politic. Applied to
lesbianism as an identity, this would mean that every lesbian, because
she has experienced oppression on the basis of her sexuality, holds
political positions that oppose other forms of oppression against other
disempowered identities which she may or may not possess based upon
identity categories such as race, ethnicity, religion, class, age and dis-
ability. In a universe of perfected identity politics, there are no racist
11. Cf R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), a unanimous opinion holding
a type of hate-crime statute unconstitutional. See generally Robson, Incendiary Categories, supra
note 2, at 20-27.
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lesbians, no ageist women, no anti-Semitic African-Americans, no ho-
mophobic people who are disabled. Identity politics has preoccupied
much of recent progressive theory, but it occupies a privileged position
in the development of contemporary lesbian theory. For example, as
articulated in the early 1970s by The Furies, an influential lesbian-femi-
nist collective, "Lesbians, as outcasts from every culture but their own
have the most to gain by ending class, race, and national supremacy
within their own ranks."12 Lesbian poet and theorist Adrienne Rich
similarly notes that as a "lesbian/feminist" any passive subservience to
the order of men which has profited from slavery and imperialism, as
well as enforced heterosexuality and misogyny, is against her own self-
interest.3 As expressed by lesbian historian Lillian Faderman, the
1970s desire for "Lesbian Nation" produced communities with "various
dogmas" regarding "class, race, food and ecology consciousness" and"political activity," which "were not unlike those of the hippie counter-
culture and the New Left, but filtered always through a radical feminist
awareness." 14 Lesbian attention to political issues other than lesbianism
persists: the "struggle to take each other's cultures and systems of op-
pression seriously" continues.' s
Yet even among its most fervent lesbian adherents, identity poli-
tics prevails as a normative theory rather than a descriptive one. The
statement of The Furies collective that lesbians have much to gain by
resisting oppression and of Adrienne Rich that lesbians act against their
own self-interest by accepting oppression are admonitions, not summa-
ries of inherent or universal lesbian traits. Faderman's use of "dogma"
to describe such political positions is used in the context of a discus-
12. Ginny Berson, The Furies, in LESBIANISM AND THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 15, 18
(Nancy Myron & Charlotte Bunch eds, 1975).
13. This obedience renders her "woman-identification [as] mere 'sexual preference,"' the
"erotic self still distorted and constrained." ADRIENNE RICH, Disloyal to Civilization: Feminism,
Racism, Gynephobia, in ON LIES, SECRETS, AND SILENCE: SELECTED PROSE 1966 - 1978, at
275, 310 (1979).
14. LILLIAN FADERMAN, ODD GIRLs AND TWILIGHT LOVERS: A HISTORY OF LESBIAN LIFE
IN TwEmN m-CemJY AMERICA 230 (1991).
The notion of "Lesbian Nation" had its most public expression in Jill Johnston's Lesbian
Nation, a journalistic argument for lesbianism as a "feminist solution." As Johnston contended:
Historically the lesbian had two choices: being criminal or going straight. The present
revolutionary project is the creation of a legitimate state defined by women ....
The totally woman committed woman, or lesbian, who shares this consciousness with
other women, is the political nucleus of a woman's or lesbian state - a state that
women cannot achieve by demand from the male bastion but only from within from
exclusive woman strength building its own institutions of self support and identity.
JILL JOHNSTON, LESBIAN NATION: TH1E FEMINIST SOLUTION 277-78 (1973).
15. Bette S. Tallen, How Inclusive Is Feminist Political Theory?: Questions for Lesbians, in
LESBIAN PHILOSOPHIES AND CULTURES 241, 254 (Jeffner Allen ed., 1990).
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sion of "political correctness," a term that has received subsequent
widespread usage outside of the lesbian communities of the 1970S.' 6
The possibility of being "politically incorrect" for "some infraction of
the code," 17 recognizes that a correspondence between sexuality and
politics is neither imperative nor absolute. Any conflation of sexual and
political identities conflicts with a premise at least as powerful as iden-
tity politics; the premise that lesbian existence is a quasi-universal phe-
nomenon. 18 Slogans such as "A Lesbian Republican is an Oxymoron"
compete with "We are Everywhere" on T-shirts and buttons, as well as
in discourse.' 9 One can exist as a lesbian without possessing lesbian
politics.
Thus, identity politics posits a series of expectations and aspira-
tions rather than a claim to experiential reality; otherwise, a criticism of
any lesbian as politically incorrect for failing to satisfy standards of les-
bian politics would be meaningless.' The aspiration that is identity
politics recognizes an ability to analogize between various identities.
When analogizing is not required, however, identity politics re-
veals its most powerful expectation, perhaps approaching a claim to
reality. It would be "realistic" to assume that when one's own identity
is implicated, one's politics will lean toward the emancipatory rather
than the oppressive. Such a position, however, neglects both the strug-
gles to define what is emancipatory and the effects of internalized op-
pression.
This most powerful aspect of identity politics, among others, was
recently raised in the context of a nomination to the United States Su-
preme Court. Those of us who believed that an African-American
should be nominated to the Supreme Court upon the retirement of the
Court's first African-American, the civil rights champion Thurgood
16. See, eg, Mark Tushnet, Political Correctness, the Law and the Legal Academy, 4
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 127 (1992).
17. FADERMAN, supra note 14, at 230.
18. See, eg., SUSAN CAVIN, LESBIAN ORIGINS (1985).
19. For a discussion of this competition, see Ann Ferguson, Is There A Lesbian Culture?,
in LESBIAN PHILOSOPHIES AND CULTURES, supra note 15, at 63.
20. The aspirational aspects of lesbian identity politics and political correctness are ad-
dressed in a recent essay by lesbian-feminist theorist Marilyn Frye:
I persist in being able to hear the phrase 'politically correct' non-ironically and as a
positive term. It sounds like a phrase I might have coined to name something I want
to be - I want to "be political" and to get things right and not get them wrong.
This seems to be the route both to my own narrow happiness and to my fullest
possible engagement in the welfare and happiness of many others both near and
distant.
MARILYN FRYE, Getting it Right, in WILLFUL VIRGIN: ESSAYS IN FEMINISM 1976-1992, at 13,
14 (1992).
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Marshall, did so because of a belief that based upon Marshall's exam-
ple, a Justice with knowledge of racism would work to eradicate it."
Clarence Thomas, an African-American, nominated and confirmed as
Justice, described his own racially-shaped experiences but did not dem-
onstrate any commitment to the eradication of racism.22 Instead, his
racial identity insulated him from investigation into his lack of commit-
ment to eradicate racism.' His deployment of racist stereotypes, nota-
bly in his portrayal of his sister as a "welfare queen," was obscured.24
Clarence Thomas demonstrates that race as identity and race as politic
are distinct.2
The disjuncture between identity and politics is also evident in the
21. See generally CARL T. ROWAN, DREAM MAKERS, DREAM BREAKERS: TlE WORLD OF
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL (1993); William J. Brennan, Jr., Justice Thurgood Marshall:
Advocate for Human Need in American Jurisprudence, 40 MD. L REV. 390 (1981); Maria L.
Marcus, Learning Together: Justice Marshall's Desegregation Opinions, 61 FORDHAM L REV.
69 (1992); Cass R. Sunstein, On Marshall's Conception of Equality, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1267
(1992).
22. See generally A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr, An Open Letter to Justice Clarence Thomas
from a Federal Judicial Colleague, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1005 (1992).
23. As Margaret Burnham notes-
Thomas was more vulnerable than any previous nominee - at least since Rehnquist -
on civil rights matters, because, unlike, the previous nominees, he had made his ca-
reer as a civil rights basher . . . [H]is record on civil rights was ample and unam-
biguous.
But, apparently intimidated by the Pin Point [Georgia, where Thomas spent his
childhood] story, the senators barely asked Thomas about the policies he followed at
the [Equal Employment Opportunity Commission], where he had been Reagan's hat-
chet man .... Thomas had led the ideological charge against affirmative action.
But when he was questioned by senators about his views and his record, he silenced
them by reminding them that "it should be clear from my biography that I under-
stand that racism exists."
Margaret A. Burnham, The Supreme Court Appointment Process and the Politics of Race and
Sex; in RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER: ESSAYS ON ANITA HILL, CLARENCE
THOMAS, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 290, 302 (Toni Morrison ed., 1992)
[hereinafter RACE-ING JUSTICE].
24. See, eg., Wahneema Lubiano, Black Ladies, Welfare Queens, and State Minstrels:
Ideological War by Narrative Means, in RACE-ING JUSTICE, supra note 23, at 323; Christine
Stansell, White Feminists and Black Realities: The Politics of Authenticity, in RACE-ING JUSTICE,
supra note 23, at 251, 260-63.
25. As African-American theorist Cornel West expresses it:
All people with black skin and African phenotype are subject to potential white-su-
premacist abuse. Hence, all black Americans have some interest in resisting racism -
even if their interest is confined solely to themselves as individuals rather than to
larger black communities. Yet how this "interest" is defined and how individuals and
communities are understood vary. So any claim to black authenticity - beyond being
the potential object of racist abuse and heir to a grand tradition of black struggle -
is contingent on one's political definition of black interest and one's ethical under-
standing of how this interest relates to individuals and communities in and outside
black America. In short, blackness is a political and ethical construct.
Cornel West, Black Leadership and the Pitfalls of Racial Reasoning, in RACE-ING JUSTICE,
supra note 23, at 390, 393-94.
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lesbian context. "There are a lot of people who believe that Anne [-
Imelda] Radice is the lesbian Clarence Thomas."26 President Bush ap-
pointed Radice to serve as chair of the National Endowment for the
Arts (NEA). Under its former chair, John Frohnmayer, the NEA had
been mired in controversies surrounding the funding of lesbian and gay
artistic and literary projects. Conservative Senator Jesse Helms success-
fully orchestrated a law forbidding arts grants to be used to "promote,
disseminate, or produce" art which included depictions of "homoeroti-
cism" or was "obscene."27Congress subsequently amended this provi-
sion to provide that artistic excellence and merit are to be judged
"taking into consideration general standards of decency" and that "ob-
scenity is without artistic merit, is not protected speech, and shall not
be funded." 28 Radice, aptly described as "a lesbian even Bush and
Helms could love," 2 explicitly stated that under her leadership the
NEA would continue to examine the sexual content of arts projects,
and that she would veto funding for any projects with "difficult subject
matter" or "sexually explicit" matter," terms which are generally un-
derstood as pertaining to lesbian and gay art and literature.31 In the
realm of political appointments, Radice's sexuality is atypical32 al-
26. Quoted in Maer Roshan, Anne Radice and the Politics of Appeasement, QW, June 7,
1992, at 23, 24.
27. Act of Oct. 23, 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-121, § 304(a), 103 Stat. 741, (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 954(d) (1990)).
28. Pub. L. No. 101-512, § 103(b), 104 Stat. 1963 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 954(d)
(1990)).
For discussions of the controversy, including its First Amendment ramifications, see
Donald W. Hawthorne, Subversive Subsidization: How NEA Art Funding Abridges Private
Speech, 40 KAN. L R . 437 (1992); Robert M. O'Neil, Artists, Grants and Rights: The NEA
Controversy Revisited, 9 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HuM. RTS. 85 (1991); Symposium, Art, the First
Amendment and the NEA Controversy, 14 NOVA L REV. 317 (1990); Nancy Ravitz, Note, A
Proposal to Curb Congressional Interference with the National Endowment for the Arts, 9
CARDozo ARTs & ENT. W. 475 (1991).
See also Bella Lewitzky Dance Found. v. Frolmmayer, 754 F. Supp.. 774 (C.D. Cal.
1991) (holding that the NEA's requirement that grant recipients certify compliance with the
policy against obscenity was unconstitutionally vague and chilling of protected speech); cf. For-
dyce v. Frolmmayer, 763 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1991) (denying standing to a taxpayer protesting
NEA's partial funding of the "anti-Christian" production "Tongues of Flame" on grounds that
such funding violated the First Amendment's establishment clause).
29. Tommi A. Mecca, A Lesbian Even Bush and Helms Could Lov, S.F. BAY TIMES,
June 4, 1992, at 4.
30. Id.
31. "In NEA terms, sexually explicit has often been a code word for gay [and lesbi-
an] .... The battles that have raised the most opposition in the past few years have always
been related to sex, and with few exceptions they've been overwhelmingly related to lesbian
and gay sex." Randall Bourscheidt, quoted in Roshan, supra note 26, at 24.
32. See infra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
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though perhaps not arbitrary.33 In the realm of identity politics, Radice
is anomalous; a lesbian who not only does not share the progressive
politics but also is hostile to lesbian sexuality.
A "lesbian even Bush and Helms could love" effectively falsifies
any claim to universal truth that identity politics might assert. "Lesbi-
an" cannot unfailingly operate as shorthand for a certain set of political
positions. Identity politics, recognized as normative rather than descrip-
tive, allows for the possibility of a lesbian Supreme Court Justice being
anti-lesbian. This is the specter that any proposal for a lesbian Supreme
Court Justice must contemplate.
POSTMODERNISM AS POST-LESBIANISM
Not only is identity politics subject to dispute on the grounds that
there is no necessary connection between one's identity and one's poli-
tics, it is also subject to a more devastating critique of the notion of
identity itself. The critique of identity is largely derived from
postmodernist 4 critiques of subjectivity, positing the "death of the
subject." As articulated by Fredric Jameson, one of the most respected
American proponents and scholars of postmodernism, this position sub-
33. See Roshan, supra note 26, at 24:
To some observers, the fact that a widely known, lesbian was appointed to a position
so mired in sexual politics seems to be much more than an accident. In fact, an
interesting line of speculation gaining ground in more cynical comers of the art
world is that Radice was appointed to her NEA post because of- not despite - her
lesbianism.
The article quotes a "well-connected gay source at the NEA" as opining that "the administration
realized that, as a lesbian, she'd be less susceptible to all the slak [sic] she would be getting
about homophobia." Id.
34. I am using the terms "postmodernist" and "postmodemism" throughout this Article to
connote a philosophical perspective, as summarized for example by Jane Flax:
[Plostmodern philosophy is not a unified and homogenous field. The persons and
discourses associated with postmodemism include Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida,
Deleuze and Guattari, Lyotard, Rorty, Cavell, Barthes, semiotics, deconstruction, psy-
choanalysis, archaeology, genealogy, and nihilism. Postmodernists share at least one
common object of attack-the Enlightenment-but they approach this object from many
different points of view and attack it with various methods and for diverse purposes.
Despite their many differences, these discourses are all "deconstructive;" they
seek to distance us from and make us skeptical about the ideas concerning truth,
knowledge, power, history, self, and language that are often taken for granted within
and serve as legitimations for contemporary Western culture.
JANE FLAX, THINKING FRAGMENTS: PsYCHOANALYsIS, FEMINISM, & POSTMODERNISM IN THE
CONTEMPORARY WEST 29 (1990). Thus, although I agree that postmodernism is "the cultural
era in which we live" and "the set of cultural products created" during this era, J.M. Balkin,
What is Postmodern Constitutionalism?, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1966, 1967, 1969 (1992), I intend to
stress the theoretical aspects. Post-structuralism, a term more specifically associated with philoso-
phy rather than culture, is a narrower term preferred by some. However, I decline to use post-
structuralism because it is not the term generally employed by contemporary American theorists;
that term is postmodernism.
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scribes to the notion that "individualism and personal identity is a thing
of the past; that the old individual or individualist subject is 'dead';
and that one might even describe the concept of the unique individual
and the theoretical basis of individualism as ideological." 35 Any appeal
to individual authenticity or even freedom is suspect from a
postmodernist perspective. This allows a postmodernist heterosexual
male law professor to criticize a postmodernist lesbian law professor for
not being sufficiently postmodem because she "wants to validate the
lived reality of lesbians through resort to the 'authentic self.' 
Postmodernist critiques of identity also argue that even assuming
there is an individual subject, any identities that inhere in individual
subjects are the result of historically specific and contingent discourses
of power. The work of the influential French philosopher and intellec-
tual Michel Foucault is an extended argument of this position. 7 In his
last works, devoted to sexuality, Foucault argued that the "homosexual"
was an invention of nineteenth century medico-juridical discourses,3
35. Fredric Jameson, Post'nodernism and Consumer Society, in POSTMODERNISM AND ITS
DISCONTENTS: TiEouEs, PRACtnCES 13, 17 (E. Ann Kaplan ed., 1988).
36. Allan C. Hutchinson, Identity Crisis: The Politics of Interpretation, 26 NEW ENG. L.
REV. 1173, 1194 (1992). Hutchinson, who identifies himself as a postmodernist and as a
"white, male, heterosexual, forty-year old academic of working class background," id. at 1177,
is critiquing Patricia A. Cain, Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories, 4 BERKELEY
WOMEN'S LJ. 191 (1989), in which Cain argues that postmodernism holds the most promise
for feminist theory. Hutchinson argues that Cain's use of the "authentic self" is a "subtheme
that runs strongly through the essay that compromises her commitment to postmodernism," 26
NEW ENG. L REV. at 1194, rendering her sketch of freedom "not postmodern in character or
ambition," id. at 1195.
Hutchinson illustrates what he refers to as the failing of Cain's "modernist mentality:"
[S]he goes so far as to say that "male homosexuality is a practice that contradicts
the assumption of universal heterosexuality, but affirms male-centered reality." Yet
this surely denies the lived experience of many gay men. In a world of almost com-
pulsory heterosexuality, their reality is equally marginal and invisible.
Id. at 1196 (citing 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. at 192 n.1). Thus, postmodernism perfected
renders the experiences of gay men and lesbians "equally marginal and invisible." Id. I would
suggest that only the most arrogant gay men would affirm that their own reality of marginality
and invisibility is equal to the reality of lesbians in our world of gendered power. For further
discussion, see ROBSON, (Our)LAw, supra note 2.
37. Foucault's primary works in English translation include: 1 THE HISTORY OF SEXUAL-
Try: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley trans., 1978); 2 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: THE USE
OF PLEASURE (Robert Hurley trans., 1985); 3 THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: THE CARE OF THE
SELF (Robert Hurley trans., 1986); DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE PRISON .(Alan
Sheridan trans., 1977); THE BIRTH OF THE CLINIC. AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF MEDICAL PERCEPTION
(A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., 1973); THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith
trans., 1972); THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF ThE HUMAN SCIENCES (Alan
Sheridan trans., 1970); MADNESS AND CIVILIZATON: A HISTORY OF INSANITY IN ThE AGE OF
REASON (Richard Howard trans., 1965).
38. Foucault argues that:
There is no question that the appearance in nineteenth-century psychiatry, jurispru-
dence, and literature of a whole series of discourses on the species and subspecies of
442 ST. THOMAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
an argument that has gained ascendancy and is presently the legitimate
version.39 Foucault, himself a gay man, rejected the notion of sexual
identity,4 despite his involvement with gay liberation in America as
well as in France during the last years of his life.4'
Sexuality has been fertile ground for the postmodernist contesta-
tion of the coherence of identity categories, in part because lesbian and
gay theorizing has been profoundly influenced by all aspects of
postmodernism. 42 Such contestations can be rather grandiose. For ex-
homosexuality, inversion, pederasty, and "psychic hermaphrodism" made possible a
strong advance of social controls into this area of "perversity"; but it also made
possible the formation of a "reverse" discourse: homosexuality began to speak in its
own behalf, to demand that its legitimacy or "naturality" be acknowledged, often in
the same vocabulary, using the same categories by which it was medically disquali-
fied.
1 MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, supra note 37, at 101.
39. The recitation of this "fact" in legal scholarship includes Anne B. Goldstein, History,
Homosexuality and Political Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v.
Hardwick, 97 YALE LJ. 1073, 1087 (1988) ("No attitude toward 'homosexuals' or
'homosexuality' can really be identified before the mid-nineteenth century because the concept
did not exist until then.'); Nan D. Hunter, Life After Hardwick, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L L REV.
531, 537 (1992) (citing JEFFREY WEEKS, COMING OuTr HOMOSEXUAL POLITICS IN BRITAIN 23-
32 (1977)) ('The word 'homosexual' and the idea that the homosexual was a different kind of
person were developed by late nineteenth-century sexologists proposing medicalized causation
theories for sexual behavior.'); Robert B. Mison, Homophobia in Manslaughter: The Homosexu-
al Advance as Insufficient Provocation, 80 CAL. L. REV. 133, 148 (1992) (citing JOHtN
BOSWEUL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY 42 (1980), WEEKS, supra,
and WAYNE DYNES, Gay, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF HOMOSEXUALITY (1990)) ("The term 'homo-
sexual' did not originate until the late nineteenth century.').
40. For example, discussing homosexuality in an interview, Foucault referred to a recent
biography of Proust in which the author demonstrated.
[H]ow difficult it is to give meaning to the proposition 'Proust was a homosexual.' It
seems to me that it is finally an inadequate category. Inadequate, that is, in that we
can't really classify behavior on the one hand, and the term can't restore a type of
experience on the other.
Interview, Sexual Choice, Sexual Act: Foucault and Homosexuality, in POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY,
CULTORE: INTERVIEWS AND OTHER WRmNGS OF MICHEL FOUCAULT 1977-1984, at 286, 292
(Lawrence D. Kritzman ed., 1988). Similarly, in a recent biography of Foucault, an interchange
in 1975 between "a young gay militant" and Foucault is described, in which the younger man
asks Foucault his opinion about "gay liberation" and Foucault reportedly responded, "I believe
the term 'gay' has become obsolete," and that people "are neither this nor that, gay nor
straight." JAMES MILLER THE PASSION OF MICHEL FOUCAULT 254 (1993).
41. MILLER, supra note 40, at 254-57.
42. The embracing of postmodernist discourse by the lesbian/gay/bisexual academic commu-
nity is evident from the Fourth Annual Gay and Lesbian Studies Conference, which included
presentations such as "AIDS and Post-Modernism," "Postmodern Lesbianism," "When Jack
Blinks: (si)ghting gay desire in Ann Bannon's Beebo Brnker," "'Who are "we"?' 'Gay'
'Identity' as political (e)motion," "Homosexuality and the Uncanny: What's Fishy in Lacan," "'I
don't want to discourage invention': Foucault's interviews and queer theory/practice," and
"Anonymous Sex with Foucault."
As I have argued elsewhere, Robson, Embodiments, supra note 2, I believe it is no
accident that lesbian/gay/bisexual studies has enthusiastically adopted postmodernism. No matter
how queer we are, if we (re)present our queerness on our bodies in a trendy enough style, if
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ample, lesbian theorist Judith Butler argues that the incoherency of
sexual categories like lesbian are precisely their appeal. She states that
she is "skeptical about how the 'I' is determined as it operates under
the title of the lesbian sign," and argues that identity categories such as
lesbianism are "sites of necessary trouble:"
In fact, if the category were to offer no trouble, it would cease to
be interesting to me: it is precisely the pleasure produced by the
instability of those categories which sustains the various erotic
practices that make me a candidate for the category to begin with.
To install myself within the terms of an identity category would be
to turn against the sexuality that the category purports to de-
scribe .... 43
This is a rejection not only of any (pre)determined connections between
lesbian identity and politics, but also of any determinable connections
between lesbian identity and anything else, except instability. Any sexu-
ality that might be named lesbian is precisely too unstable to be named
anything at all.'
Postmodernism relegates lesbianism to a precarious position: post-
modernism entails post-lesbianism. The postmodernist instability of
lesbian identity (as well as the instability of gendered identity) makes
possible a lesbian who has sexual relationships exclusively with men,
or even a "lesbian man." Such postmodernist possibilities "make lesbi-
anism, at least as we have known it, impossible."45 A definition of
lesbian as a woman who gives her erotic and affectional attention to
other women rests on a gendered axis, an axis that postmodernists also
dispute.4 Yet, lesbians also dispute the gendered axis, albeit with a
result different from the dissolution of lesbianism.47 Apart from
we wear the right footnotes like accessories, if we express the body's desires in a manner
complicated and oblique enough, then maybe we will be tolerated. This is not to say that there
are no other reasons that postmodernist discourse might be useful. Nevertheless, I believe the
intellectual sophistication of postmodernism is an important factor resulting in its widespread
adoption within the gay/lesbian/bisexual academic community.
43. Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, in INSIDE/OUT: LESBIAN THEORIES,
GAY THEORIES 13, 14 (Diana Fuss ed., 1991).
44. Butler does not limit her argument to lesbian sexuality and identity: "[This might be
true for any identity category which seeks to control the very eroticism that it claims to
describe and authorize, much less 'liberate'." Id. at 14.
45. Jacquelyn N. Zita, Male Lesbians and the Postmodernist Body, 7 HYPATIA 106, 124
(1992).
46. Se, e.g., JUDITH BUnLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF
IDENTITY (1990) (a postmodernist critique of gender identity).
47. Perhaps the most famous among these is Monique Wittig, one of the first theorists
who devastatingly deconstructed and anti-essentialized gender. For Wittig, "woman" exists only
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postmodernism, lesbians have also interrogated the meaning of erotic,
affectional, and sex as relational categories that apply to lesbian inter-
action, albeit again resisting the conclusion that such relations are un-
stable and impossible. 48 As I, among others, have argued elsewhere,
the cessation of the category "lesbian" is a grave potential danger.49
Yet the impossibility of lesbianism is precisely the goal of post-
modernist philosophers; a goal that reverberates in common conversa-
tions in this postmodern era in which people eschew "labels" that
might be applicable to their sexuality. Lesbianism, of course, is not
uniquely impossible. All sexual identities, as well as gender and racial
ones, are ultimately impossible. Within postmodernism's ambit, even
the identity of "postmodernist" is objectionable.50
Within legal theory, repudiation of identity categories has general-
ly been more circumspect.51 In a pertinent if obverse example,
postmodernist theorist Jennifer Wicke argues that [lesbian and] gay
advocates should be supported in any quest to extend marital rights to
intimate relationships:
Marriage can be subjected to a withering critique as a transparently
ideological institution, but in this case too the importance of reserv-
ing a vocabulary of 'rights' as a legal subject transcends those
objections since the political objectives of securing [lesbian and]
gay marriage rights outweigh any hesitance about the identities pre-
in terms of men, only in terms of "heterosexual systems of thought and heterosexual economic
systems" which leads Wittig to her famous pronouncement that "Lesbians are not women."
MONIQUE WITTG, The Straight Mind, FEMINIST ISSUES, Summer 1980, at 1, reprinted in THiE
STRAIGHT MIND AND OTHER EssAYs 21, 32 (1992). However, Wittig has been accused of
being a "lesbian modernist," because she posits homosexuality (specifically lesbianism) as
outside the "heterosexual matrix," and as a "purification," and thus as a unification of lesbian-
ism. BUTJE, supra note 46, at 121; DIANE Fuss, ESSENTIALLY SPEAKING: FEMINISM, NATURE
AND DIFFERENCE 43 (1989).
Similarly, lesbian ethicist Sarah Lucia Hoagland, who has probably never been labelled a
postmodernist, contends that "woman" is a normative category to regulate female behavior and
the "category 'woman' is not a reflection of fact but instead tells us how to determine fact."
SARAH L. HOAGLAND, LESBIAN ETHICS 15 (1988).
48. See, eg., JULIA PENELOPE, Does It Take One to Know One?, in CALL MB LESBIAN:
LESBIAN LIvES, LESBIAN THEORY 17-38 (1992).
49. Robson, Embodiments, supra note 2.
50. See David C. Hoy, Foucault: Modern or Postmodern?, in AFrER FOUCAULT 12, 38
(Jonathan Arac ed., 1988) (concluding that "Foucault was a consistent postmodern in that he
would never have called himself [one]').
51. See, eg., Betsy B. Baker, Constructing Justice: Theories of the Subject in Law and
Literature 75 MINN. L. REv. 581 (1991); Martha Minow, Identities, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMAN.
97 (1991).
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supposed by the marriage.5 2
In reply, Mary Joe Frug, the late postmodernist feminist legal theo-
rist,53 argued that it is precisely the law's preoccupation with enforc-
ing identity that produces the injustice:
Law requires all legal claimants to assume a particular posture - a
partial identity - in seeking judicial assistance; we must leave aside
much of the multiplicity and complexity of our lives in order to
engage in legal discourse. Injustice occurs, as in the . . [lesbian
and] gay marriage campaign, when legal rules structure these par-
ticular postures in such a way that subordinate groups cannot
squeeze into them at all. In these situations, legal rules need to
expand the narrow and rigid character of the subject position they
impose as a condition of admission to the legal arena. 54
Thus, although disagreeing, neither Wicke nor Frug promote the aban-
donment of identity categories, apparently judging such categories nec-
essary for social change. Interestingly, however, both conclude that
conditions of the subordinate identity category - lesbians and gay men -
would be improved by participation in an arrangement definitive of the
dominant category - the heterosexual right to marry - a debatable as-
sumption with which I disagree.55
52. Jennifer Wicke, Postmodern Identity and the Legal Subject, 62 COLO. L REV. 455,
467 (1991).
53. Mary Joe Frug, a feminist law professor teaching at New England School of Law, was
murdered in March 1991. Tributes to her life and work include: David Kennedy et al., In
Memoriam: Mary Joe Frug, 62 COLO. L. REV. 433 (1991); In Memoriam, Mary Joe Frug, 1941-
1991, YALE J.L & FEMINISM at i (No. 2, 1991); Frances Olsen, In Memoriam: Mary Joe Frug,
14 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. at i (1991); Carl Tobias, Tribute to Mary Joe Frug, 24 CONN. L
REV. at ix (1991); Memorial Service for Mary Joe Frug, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 639 (1992).
Her posthumously published work includes MARY J. FRUG, POSTMODERN LEGAL FEMINISM
(1992).
For an excellent engagement with Frug's work from a lesbian perspective, see Ruth
Colker, The Example of Lesbians: A Posthumous Reply to Mary Joe Frug, 105 HARV. L REV.
1084 (1992).
54. Mary J. Frug, Law and Postmodernism: The Politics of a Marriage, 62 COLO. L REV.
483, 487 (1991).
55. My own position is that the availability of lesbian marriage would promote a division
between the "good" lesbians (married, and therefore monogamous, familial, and conservative)
and the "other" lesbians (unmarried and therefore promiscuous, independent and radical). See
Ruthann Robson & S.E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate Partners and Lesbian Legal
Theory, 63 TEMP. L REV. 511 (1990).
Both the availability and desirability of marriage, and other coupling mechanisms, for
lesbians and gay men has received attention in the legal literature. See, eg., Vada Berger,
Domestic Partnership Initiatives, 40 DEPAUL L REv. 417 (1991); G. Sidney Buchanan, Same-
Sex Marriage: The Linchpin Issue, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 541 (1985); Harlon L. Dalton,
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CLAIMING & DISCLAIMING LESBIAN IDENTITY
Much of the postmodernist impulse to transcend identity categories
is certainly an understandable one, even as it arguably re-establishes the
unique individual (a person beyond all labels) that postmodernism also
rejects.56 This impulse approaches irresistibility in the context of sexu-
al identity categories because these categories must be explicitly
claimed.57 Lesbian identity is generally not transmitted through cues
from one's parents, as are cultural, religious, and gender identities, but
is instead claimed in the "coming out" process, often in direct contra-
diction to normative expectations.-5
Coming out is a cornerstone of lesbian experience and theory.59
Its structure is a collective and individual narrative of identity. Al-
though, arguably, identities are accessible only as narrative, 60 the com-
ing-out narrative is endemic to lesbian narratives. 61 Despite individual
Reflections on the Lesbian and Gay Marriage Debate, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY: REV. LESBIAN &
GAY LEGAL ISSUES 1 (1991); Nitya Duclos, Some Complicating Thoughts on Same-Sex Mar-
riage 1 LAW & SExuALITY: Rv. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 31 (1991); Mary C. Dunlap,
The Lesbian and Gay Marriage Debate: A Microcosm of Our Hopes and Troubles in the
Nineties, 1 LAW & SEXUALTY: REV. LESBIAN & GAY LEGAL ISSUES 63 (1991); Alissa Fried-
man, The Necessity for State Recognition of Same-Sex Marriage: Constitutional Requirements
and Evolving Notions of Family, 3 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 134 (1987-88); Nan D. Hunter,
Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW & SEXuALrrY: REV. LESBIAN & GAY
LEGAL ISSUES 9 (1991); Hannah Schwarzschild, Same-Sex Marriage and Constitutional Privacy:
Moral Threat and Legal Anomaly, 4 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 94 (1988-89); Gina M. Torielli,
Recent Development, Protecting the Nontraditional Couple in Times of Medical Crises, 12
HARv. WOMEN'S i.J. 220 (1989); Amy L. Brown, Note, Broadening Anachronistic Notions of
"Family" in Proxy Decisionmaking for Unmarried Adults, 41 HASTINGS LJ. 1029 (1990).
56. See supra notes 34-54 and accompanying text.
57. Sexuality categories are not unique in this regard. For an especially provocative account
of this phenomenon in a racial/ethnic context, see MICHELLE CLIFF, CLAIMING AN IDENTITY
THEY TAUGHT ME To DESPISE (1980), in which a lesbian writer interrogates her own identity
as a light-skinned Jamaican descendant of slaves from Africa. See also Judy Scales-Trent, Com-
monalities: On Being Black and White, Different and the Same, 2 YALE J.L & FEMINISM 305
(1990).
58. The extent to which normative expectations are changed by a lesbian/gay/bisexual
parent are uncertain. A lesbian daughter of a lesbiah mother can be a politically dangerous
research topic given the judicial climate preferring studies that prove that a child of a lesbian
mother is no more likely to be lesbian/gay than a child of heterosexual parents; thus, it is
within the "best interests of the child" to allow custody to a lesbian mother.
59. A sampling of syllabi from courses on lesbianism reveals that "coming out" is often
the first unit in the course; a unit may include students' writings and discussions of their own
coming out experiences. See Sample Syllabi from Courses on Lesbianism, in LESBIAN STUDIES:
PRESENT AND FUTURE 217-35 app. (Margaret Cruikshank ed., 1982).
60. See CELIA KITZINGER, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUcnoNISM OF LESBIANISM 90 (1987)
(noting that the subject of her study was not any "real" br "underlying" lesbian identity, but
the identity account itself in recognition that a social scientist only has access to the account).
61. As lesbian literary critic Bonnie Zimmerman writes:
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variations, coming out is generally considered as a process through the
stages of self-labelling, a communication of feelings or identity to oth-
ers, a location and participation in a community, an integration of sexu-
ality into the self, and possibly the proclamation of identity to friends,
parents, children, employers, and the world at large.62 This narrative is
constructed as an emancipatory (and implicitly irreversible) trajectory
involving the recognition and claiming of one's authentic identity.
Within the confines of such a narrative, not coming out - remaining "in
the closet" - is an inauthentic, negative and generally disparaged
state.63 Not surprisingly, in our postmodern era, this narrative has been
rightly criticized as simplistic. 64
Yet the rhetoric of coming out and closets has remained vital in
lesbian/gay theory, even as it has proliferated beyond references to
Coming out is the rite of passage through which a lesbian establishes and affirms
herself. It is the tale we tell ourselves to state who we are and why we exist, a gift
shared between lovers . . . and among friends. It is the currency, the means of ex-
change, within Lesbian Nation . .. . The coming out story explains how we came to
be lesbians, how our consciousness formed and our identity developed. It repeats a
few basic patterns and defines a collective identity. The coming out story is one of
the fundamental lesbian myths of origin, the first basic tale of all lesbian communi-
ties .... mhe first movement is always a personal and interior one, the claiming
or discovering of the lesbian within one's self. In lesbian novels, this movement is
consistently imagined as a journey.
BONNIE ZIMMERMAN, THE SAFE SEA OF WOMEN: LESBIAN FICTION 1969-1989, at 34 (1990).
62. MARGARET CRUIKSHAN, THE GAY AND LESBIAN LIBERATION MOVEMENT 46-48
(1992).
63. Remaining closeted is also considered inimical to collective identity and survival. To
quote one of many recent examples, this one occurring in a discussion of the boycott of
Colorado in response to Amendment 2, see note 86, coming out is integral to civil rights:
The only protection we have now is ourselves. As important as anti-discrimination
laws are . . . it is even more important to put a face on our movement, and
achieving that goal requires coming out to the world. Those who have come out al-
ready have laid the groundwork. Even more will be accomplished when the rest of
you muster your courage and come out - even when it's not fun, even when it's
inconvenient, and even when it places you in harm's way.
Niles Merton, Pride and Prejudice, ADVOCAT, Feb. 9, 1993, at 6.
64. Resistance to the "grand narrative" that legitimates and totalizes that which it purports
to explain is a central idea of postmodernism. See JEAN-FRANCOIS LYOTARD, THE POSTMODERN
CONDITION: A REPORT ON KNOWLEDGE at xxiv passim (Geoff Bennington & Brian Massumi
trans, 1984) ("Simplifying to the extreme, I define postmodern as incredulity toward
metanarratives.'). This resistance can be established through deconstructive techniques, as demon-
strated by the following passage by Judith Butler
If I claim to be a lesbian, I "come out" only to produce a new and different
"closet." The "you" to whom I come out now has access to a different region of
opacity. Indeed, the locus of opacity has simply shifted . . . . so we are out of the
closet, but into what? what new unbounded spatiality? the room, the den, the attic,
the basement, the house, the bar, the university, some new enclosure . . . . For being"out" always depends to some extent upon being "in"; it gains its meaning only
within that polarity. Hence, being "out" must produce the closet again and again in
order to maintain itself as "out."
Butler, supra note 43, at 15-16.
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lesbian and gay identity.5 One reason for the authority of the notion
of claiming lesbian identity is the often dramatic consequences atten-
dant to such a claiming. The claim can sunder previous relationships
between the claimant and her family, friends, employer, and others in
her social and professional circles. For example, a claim that one is a
lesbian can mean a loss of employment, a loss that the law rarely
deems actionable employment discrimination.6 Another reason for the
continued vitality of claiming is the imperceptibility of lesbianism given
the presumption of universal heterosexuality.
Claiming lesbian identity (or coming out) implies a volitional act,
an implication that is not universal. Lesbian literature is replete with
positive journeys toward lesbian identity, but also contains instances in
which lesbianism is initially exposed rather than confessed. 67 There are
centuries of accusations of lesbianism, accusations which often merit
legal sanctions including death, banishment, or prison, as well as con-
temporary cases in which lesbianism is an issue.'" The current "out-
ing" controversies, prompted by the revelation of one's lesbian or gay
status often by members of lesbian/gay communities for political pur-
poses,' is but the latest complicated development in the history of
involuntary disclosures of one's sexuality caused by the necessities of
claiming lesbian/gay identities.
The complications surrounding claiming and disclaiming lesbian
identity have gained national prominence, foreshadowing the specter of
a lesbian Supreme Court Justice. Although President Bill Clinton
promised to appoint a diverse cabinet,70 any possibility that lesbian
65.- Eve Sedgwick has influentially argued that the closet is the "defining structure" for
lesbian/gay oppression in this century. EvE K. SEDGVwc, EpISTEMOLOGY OF THE CLOSET 71
(1990). Sedgwick also notes that "'[t]he closet' and 'coming out,' now verging on all-purpose
phrases for the potent crossing and recrossing of almost any politically charged lines of repre-
sentation," are magnetic figures by which "homosexuality" is indicative of "wider mappings of
secrecy and disclosure, and of the private and the public." Id.
66. See ROBSON, (Our)LAW, supra note 2, at 81.
67. See, e-g., JACQUELYN H. PARK A STONE GONE MAD (1991) (16 year old girl found
with female schoolmate and sent to boarding school and psychiatrists).
68. See generally ROBSON, (OuT)LAw, supra note 2.
69. For discussions of "outing" in legal literature, emphasizing the privacy aspects, see
John P. Elwood, Note, Outing, Privacy, and the First Amendment, 102 YALE LJ. 747 (1992);
Jon E. Grant, Note, "Outing" and Freedom of the Press: Sexual Orientation's Challenge to the
Supreme Court's Categorical Jurisprudence, 77 CORNELL L REv. 103 (1991); see also RICHt-
ARD D. MOHR, GAY IDEAS: OUrtNG AND OTER CONTROVERSIEs 11-48 (1992).
70. As reported by the New York 7imes, then-candidate Clinton first articulated this prom-
ise in the third televised election debate:
The National Women's Political Caucus gave me an award, one of their good guy
awards for my involvement of women in high levels of government. And I've ap-
pointed more minorities to positions of high level in government than all the gover-
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identity might figure among the diversities remains unrealized. On the
contrary, it became important that any woman who might potentially be
claimed within a lesbian identity category disclaim any lesbian identi-
ty.71
For example, intimations of lesbianism attached to both Donna
Shalala, Clinton's successful nominee for Secretary of the Department
of Health and Human Services, and Janet Reno, Clinton's third (and
successful) nominee for Attorney General. Donna Shalala's disclaimer
of lesbianism occurred in an article in a local newspaper and was
thereafter widely reported. 72 The particular quote attributed to Shalala
is: "Have I ever lived an alternative lifestyle? The answer is no." The
article portrays the rumors of lesbianism as being generated by "gay
groups" who have subjected others "to this sort of attack." The article
also concludes that "[fqeeding the rumor was the fact that Shalala, at
51, is one of the few high-profile, single women her age in town."7
Being unmarried as a condition that necessitates a disclaimer of lesbi-
anism also occurred in Janet Reno's case, although Reno handled it a
bit differently by explicitly stating that she is "attracted to strong,
brave, rational, and intelligent men."74 Shalala's singlehood as rumor
nourishing and Reno's use of heterosexual interest to disclaim lesbian
identity occurs in a legal context which equates an absence of hetero-
sexual activity with lesbian identity.75
nors in the history of my state combined before me.
So that's what I'll do as President. I don't think we've got a person to waste,
and I think I owe the American people a White House staff, a Cabinet and appoint-
ments that look like America but that meet high standards of excellence, and that's
what I'll do.
The 1992 Campaign: Transcript of the 3d TV Debate Between Bush, Clinton and Perot, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 20, 1992, at A20. After Clinton's election, the New York Times emphasized the
diversity issue in its coverage of Clinton's appointments, see, e.g., Adam Clymer, Push for
Diversity May Cause Reversal on Interior Secretary, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 1992, at Al; Gwen
Ifill, Clinton Completes Cabinet and Points to Its Diversity, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 25, 1992, at Al.
71. As Nina Totenberg of National Public Radio reported, "the White House satisfied itself
that Reno is not gay [lesbian] before going ahead with the nomination." Doug Ireland, Press
Clips: Flying to Reno, VIUAGE VoicE, Feb. 23, 1993, at 8.
72. At the time of her nomination, Shalala was the President of the University of Wiscon-
sin at Madison, and the original piece was printed in the Madison, Wisconsin newspaper. Gay
Group Dogs Shalala with Phone Campaign, CAPITAL TIMES, Dec. 30, 1992, at 10A. One exam-
ple of the story's dissemination is Shalala: Not Lesbian, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Dec. 31, 1992, at 16.
73. CAPtTAL TIMES, supra note 72.
74. VI.M.AGE VOICE, supra note 71.
75. For example, a District of Columbia trial judge recently interrogated a woman about
her sexual partners in an action seeking to remove her children for abuse and neglect:
THE COURT: Is there some reason that the two of you slept in one bed? You are
grown women. Is there some reason why?
WITNESS: Yes, there was a reason ... A room factor... The limitation of space.
THE COURT: You know, we could probably get a clearer understanding of exactly
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Importantly, however, neither candidate relied upon any
postmodernist incoherency of the category of lesbianism; one cannot
imagine Shalala or Reno stating that "to install myself within the terms
of an identity category would be to turn against the sexuality that the
category purports to describe." 76 Even more importantly, neither candi-
date proffered a statement that her sexual orientation might be irrele-
vant to the task at hand. As one commentator expressed it, supporters
of Reno wanted to be "reassured that there aren't any culturally unac-
ceptable hair-raisers of the Dykes-on-Bikes variety in her back-
ground." 77 Another issue is a more delicate one that implicates the
disclaimer itself: "Sources close to the investigation [of Shalala] insist
the FBI check isn't a 'lesbian witch hunt,' but instead the FBI is trying
to determine whether or not the HHS secretary-designate has lied about
her sexual orientation."78 This is the classic catch-22 that contaminates
the claiming and disclaiming of lesbian identity: a claim of lesbian
identity causes one to be discriminated against as a lesbian; a dis-
claimer of lesbian identity causes one to be discredited as a liar.
PROBLEMS OF ESSENTIALIZING & ANALOGIZING IDENTITIES
The necessity for claiming lesbian identity implicates the problems
of essentializing and analogizing lesbian identities. Within identity theo-
ries, essentialism and (social) constructionism compete for explanatory
primacy. Essentialism generally theorizes from the place of "biological
what is the big mystery in this case if you could give me a very truthful straight
answer to one question.
WITNESS: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you have a sexual relationship with Gail Jones?
WITNESS: I have never.
THE COURT: well, then, let me approach it from another.way . . .Since Ms. Gail
Jones moved in your home five years ago ...and the two of you have slept in the
same bed for five years ...have you had sexual relations with any males?
WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: No women?
WITNESS: No.
THE COURT: So, you have made a monastery of your home since that time?
In re J.A. & LA., 601 A.2d 69, 77 n.7 (D.C. 1991).
Although the trial judge found there was not enough evidence to justify a finding of lesbianism
and was ultimately reversed by an appellate court for evidencing bias, the trial judge was com-
fortable with assuming that the lack of heterosexual activity implicates lesbianism.76. Sece supra note 43 and accompanying text.
77. VILLAGE VOIC, supra note 71.
78. Tracy Baim, Clinton Top Picks Include No Open Gays/Lesbians, OIflINES, Jan. 1993,
at 15. The article predicted that Shalala's honesty on the issue of her sexual orientation would
be considered during her Senate confirmation hearings. However, the sexual orientation issue is
absent from the public records of the confirmation hearings. See 139 CONG. REC. S93-01 (daily
ed. Jan. 21, 1993).
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force" while the oppositional theory of constructionism (or social con-
structionism) generally theorizes from the place of culturally defined
constructs and labels. 9 Reductively expressed, the conflict is one be-
tween nature and nurture. Despite accurate observations that the
essentialism/constructionism dichotomy has outlived its usefulness, °
the dichotomy refuses retirement. Within lesbian and gay theorizing,
however, social constructionism has assumed preeminency.8 Previous
theories, such as lesbian-feminist theories of the 1970s, are often dis-
paraged as essentialist, essentialism having become more of an insult
than a viable competing theory.82
This competition between essentialism and social constructionism
is not limited to lesbian theoretical texts. In scientific discourse, the
preoccupation with an etiology for lesbianism is expressed as a contest
between biological explanations and psychological ones. While lesbian-
ism was once generally believed to be less biological and more psycho-
79. In sexual theory, essentialism can be defined as the treatment of sexuality as a "bio-
logical force" and thus sexual identities are "cognitive realizations of genuine, underlying
differences," while (social) constructionism. can be defined as the position that sexuality and
sexual identities are constructed by society and thus sexuality and identity "belong to the world
of culture and meaning" as "labels, created by cultures and applied to the self." Steven Epstein,
Gay Politics, Ethnic Identity: The Limits of Social Constructionism, SOCIALIST REV, May-Aug.
1987, at 9, reprinted in FORMS OF DESIRE SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE SOCIAL CONSTRUC-
IONIST CONTROVERSY 239, 241-42 (Edward Stein ed., Garland Pub. 1992) (1990).
80. See id. at 241.
81. As Richard Mohr notes,
Within the emerging academic discipline of lesbian and gay studies, there is nearly
universal agreement among scholars that social factors are in some sense determinant
in homosexuality, that homosexuality is culturally constituted or produced. Indeed,
especially as espoused by Michel Foucault, this variant of cultural determinism - the
social construction of homosexuality - has achieved hagiographical status within lesbi-
an and gay studies, where it is almost always an object for witness rather than of
analysis.
MOHR, supra note 69, at 221-22. Mohr considers himself one of the few "dissenters" from this
uncritical acceptance of social constructionism, and proceeds to compellingly dissect the varieties
of social constructionism.
82. An examination of those texts, however, does not support such a blanket disparage-
ment, because the texts themselves reveal an essentialism tempered with a dedication to con-
strtctionism. For example, in the classic The Woman Identified Woman by Radicalesbians, there
is an inner core of essential lesbian identity: a lesbian "acts in accordance with her inner com-
pulsion to be a more complete and freer human being" and struggles to "expel the heavy
socialization that goes with being female" so that she can "find peace with herself." In this
same relatively short statement, however, there is also a constructionist interpretation of lesbian
identity: "Lesbian is a label invented by the Man to throw at any woman who dares to be his
equal" and "'Lesbian' is one of the sexual categories by which men have divided up humani-
ty." Even the first notorious statement of the Radicalesbian's text - "A lesbian is the rage of
all women condensed to the point of explosion" - leans toward a constructionist stance; lesbian-
ism is a political option rather than an inherent certainty. Radicalesbians, The Woman Identified
Woman, in RADICAL FEMINISM 240-42 (Anne Koedt et al. eds., 1973).
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logical,8 the most widely reported recent empirical study posits the
likelihood of a lesbian "gene." 84 This well-publicized scientific de-
baleas informs and is informed by the political/legal debate, in which
the contest usually devolves into a distinction between status and con-
duct. For example, recent controversies concerning President Clinton's
goal to halt the military's exclusion of "homosexuals" usually devolved
to a distinction between whether "homosexuality" is a status or an ac-
tivity; a debate that often occurred in the context of an explicit compar-
ison with the military's former practice of racial segregation. 86 Legal
scholarship considering the military's exclusion of lesbians and gay
men has analyzed the status/conduct dichotomy,87 at least in part be-
cause of a judicial privileging of this dichotomous distinction. Perhaps
the most famous judicial example is the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in
Ben-Shalom v. Marsh,' in which the court upheld the constitutionality
83. For example, Richard Posner argues that lesbians, possibly in distinction to gay men,
do not possess any innate sexual preference. Posner explains this lack with sociobiological
theories of evolution (fewer lesbians survived because the women who did survive had male
protectors), one empirical study of sexual preference concordance in twins (lesbianism is not a
concordant quality based upon four sets of female twins), and a gendered congenital disparity
("Maybe the wires accidentally get crossed at birth in some more or less stable percentage of
newborns, especially boys because of the greater complexity of the male reproductive system.' .
RIcHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 99, 101-02 (1992). For further elaboration of Posner's
conclusions, see Robson, Posner's Lesbians, supra note 2, at 499.
84. See J. Michael Bailey et al., Heritable Factors Influence Sexual Orientation in Women,
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY, Mar. 1993, at 217; see also Natalie Angier, Study Suggests Genes
Sway Lesbians' Sexual Orientation, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at All.
85. See, e.g., Chandler Burr, Homosexuality and Biology, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1993, at 47
(cover story); Is This Child Gay? Born or Bred: The Origins of Homosexuality, NEWSWEE I
Feb. 24, 1992, at 46 (cover story).
86. See, eg., Lynne Duke, Drawing Parallels - Gays and Blacks; Linking Military Ban to
Integration Fight Stirs Outrage Sympathy, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 1993, at Al.
Similarly, recent political initiatives in Colorado and Oregon to amend their respective
state constitutions to forbid lesbian and gay rights often employed rhetoric disputing sexuality as
an identity category commensurable to other minorities, even while simultaneously exploiting
rhetoric that undermined racial and other minorities' claims to "special treatment."
87. See, eg., Jeffrey S. Davis, Military Policy Toward Homosexuals: Scientific, Historical,
and Legal Perspectives, 131 MIL L REV. 55 (1991); Janine M. Dascenzo & Neal A. May,
Comment, Cleaning Out The Pentagon's Closet: An Overview of the Defense Department's
Anti-Gay Policy, 23 U. TOL L. REv. 433 (1992); Douglas A. Dribben, Note, Homosexuals and
the Military: Strange Bedfellows, 57 UMKC L. REV. 123 (1988); Denise Dunnigan, Note, A
New Suspect Class: A Final Reprieve for Homosexuals in the Military?, 42 OKLA. L Ruv. 273
(1989); Troy R. Holroyd, Commentary, Homosexuals and the Military: Integration br Discrimi-
nation, 8 J. CoNmEMP. HEAL~nt L & POL'Y 429 (1992); Craig W. Stedman, Comment, The
Constitution, the Military, and Homosexuals: Should the Military's Policies Concerning Homo-
sexuals be Modfied? 95 DIcK. L. REV. 321 (1991).
88. 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989). Other important cases include Pruitt v. Cheney, 963
F.2d 1160 (9th Cir. 1991); Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989); Falk
v. Secretary of the Army, 870 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1989); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d
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of a military regulation excluding "homosexuals," defined as including
persons "as to whom there is no evidence they have engaged in homo-
sexual acts either before or during military service."'
As is apparent in the military context, the importance of lesbian-
ism as a status, preferably with biological roots, is derived from the
primacy of analogizing identities. Racial and ethnic identities are argu-
ably protected identities, based in part upon constitutional theories of
equal protection. The "promise" of the (in)famous footnote four of
Carolene Products is that discrimination against "discrete and insular
minorities" such as "religious, or national, or racial minorities" will
warrant a "more searching judicial inquiry."9' To be within this prom-
ise, a discrete and insular minority must be a social minority that has
been historically discriminated against and continues to be relatively
politically powerless, the members of which possess immutable and
identifiable characteristics. 92 Thus, efforts at theorizing equal protection
for lesbian and other sexual identities often focus on analyzing the
Carolene-derived criteria, often attempting to argue lesbian identity
within the criteria and often problematizing the immutability require-
ment.93 Essentializing lesbian identity as immutable, fixed and biologi-
1068 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
89. The court reasoned:
It is true that actual lesbian conduct has not been admitted by plaintiff on any partic-
ular occasion, and the Army has offered no evidence of any such conduct. [United
States District] Judge Gordon found no reason to believe that the lesbian admission
meant that plaintiff was likely to commit homosexual acts. We see it differently.
Plaintiff's lesbian acknowledgement, if not an admission of its practice, at least can
rationally and reasonably be viewed as reliable evidence of a desire and propensity to
engage in homosexual conduct. Such an assumption cannot be said to be without
individual exceptions, but it is compelling evidence that plaintiff has in the past and
is likely to again engage in such conduct. To this extent, therefore, the regulation
does not classify plaintiff based merely upon her status as a lesbian, but upon rea-
sonable inferences about her probable conduct in the past and in the future. The
Army need not shut its eyes to the practical realities of this situation, nor be com-
pelled to engage in the sleuthing of soldiers' personal relationships for evidence of
homosexual conduct in order to enforce its ban on homosexual acts, a ban not chal-
lenged here. Plaintiff does not deny that she has engaged or will engage in homosex-
ual conduct. Plaintiff has admitted that she has a homosexual desire, but not neces-
sarily that she intends to commit homosexual acts. The Army need not try to fine
tune a regulation to fit a particular lesbian's subjective thoughts and propensities.
881 F.2d at 464. For a thoughtful analysis of this case, see Gisela Caldwell, Note, The Seventh
Circuit in Ben-Shalom v. Marsh: Equating Speech with Conduct, 24 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 421
(1991).
90. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
91. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
92. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERIcAN CONSTUTIoNAL LAW § 16, at 1436-
1672 (2d ed. 1988); Mark Strasser, Suspect Classes and Suspect Classifications: On Discrimi-
nating, Unwittingly or Otherwise, 64 TEMP. L REV. 937 (1991).
93. Compare Eliva R. Arriola, Sexual Identity and the Constitution: Homosexual Persons as
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cally determined results in the most traditional compliance with the
Carolene-derived criteria, yet such an essentialism is inconsistent with
current lesbian theorizing. 94
Analogizing is also problematic for lesbian identity within the
context of the Carolene-derived criteria. Within equal protection dis-
course; the history of equal protection as intentionally and
paradigmatically directed at racial identity results in lesbian identity
being most often analogized to racial (or ethnic) identities. Arguments
that lesbian identity is socially constructed (rather than essential), attrib-
utable to psychology (rather than biology), and is an activity (rather
than a status), supposedly taint the analogy. Such a distinction obscures
the extent to which all identities combine elements of essentialism,
including primordial ascription (what one "is") and social construction-
ism, including optional affiliation (what one "chooses"). 95 As critical
race theorists have noted, race itself is a societal construct.96
Yet analogizing is not merely faulty because racial identity is
likewise constructed. The positing of African-American racial identity
as the paradigm with which lesbianism must comport is rather unhelp-
ful because of the persistent political, legal and societal discrimination
against African-Americans and other racial minorities.' The Carolene-
derived equal protection, criteria has not guaranteed an anti-racist ethic
or reality and thus does not operate adequately even in the paradigm
case. Therefore, even a perfectly fitting analogy would be imperfect
because race is not a perfect paradigm given an emancipatory goal.
Further, the act of analogizing racial and sexual identities obscures the
a Discrete and Insular Minority, 10 WoMEN's Ris. L REP. 143 (1988) (arguing lesbian
identity conforms to the traditional discrete and insular minority criteria) with Janet E. Halley,
The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Identity,
36 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1989) (arguing a reconceptualization of the criteria to accommodate
social constructionist theory).
94. Although not absolutely inconsistent. Even ardent advocates of postmodernist theories of
social constructionism can advocate a "strategic essentialism." For example, the respected
postmodernist theorist Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak analyzes the work of a group to retrieve a
specific minority consciousness as "a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a scrupulously
visible political interest" and posits the requirements for this strategy to be successful. GAYATRI
C. SPIVAK, Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography, in IN OTHER WORLDS: EssAYs IN
CUt..'UiRAL POLInCS 197, 205 (1988). As appraised by Diana Fuss, Spivak's wisdom is that
"the permissibility, if you will, of engaging in essentialism is therefore framed and determined
by the subject-position from which one speaks." Fuss, supra note 47, at 32.
95. See Epstein, supra note 79.
96. For example, as Cornel West argues, "blackness has no meaning outside a system of
race-conscious people and practices," and that ultimately "blackness is a political and ethical
construct." West, supra note 25, at 393-94.-
97. Sees, eg., DERRiCK BELL, FACES AT THE BOTrOM OF THE WELL (1992).
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extent to which the identities are not distinct. All persons have racial
identities as well as sexual ones, or more specifically, there are many
African-American lesbians.
Moreover, paradigms of protectable identities are not limited to
racial and ethnic identities. Religious identities are dissimilar to any
racial/ethnic paradigm in many of the same ways in which sexual iden-
tities are dissimilar, especially in cases in which the religious identity is
adopted in an adult conversion process. Thus lesbian identity might be
more impeccably analogized to a born-again-Christian identity, a pro-
tected identity.9
Ultimately, however, the vitality of lesbian identity cannot rest
upon its assimilability to another protected identity, whether based upon
essentialism or constructionism. As previously argued, the analogues are
hardly aspirational and the analogies are always analogies rather than
duplicates. Further, what is essentialized is susceptible to alteration;9
what is constructed can be deconstructed.1°°
98. I thank Marianne Wesson, Professor of Law, University of Colorado, for originally
bringing this point to my attention. Although religious identities have the implicit additional
guarantee of the First Amendment, Carolene Product's footnote four specifically mentions reli-
gious minorities. 304 U.S. at 152 n.4. Further, contemporary discrimination jurisprudence, which
includes religious minorities, is not founded on the First Amendment, but is founded on notions
of equal protection as well as statutory protections such as the 1964 Civil Rights Act, especial-
ly 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (Title VII) (1988).
99. As Richard Posner, who believes that (male) homosexuality is essential and biologically
innate, argues:
Maybe we should just be patient; science, which has worked so many wonders, may
someday, perhaps someday soon, discover a "cure" for homosexuality. I suspect, how-
ever, that most persons who are already homosexual will not want to be cured, not
because they are oblivious to the advantages of being heterosexual but because being
homosexual is part of their identity . . . . But if the hypothetical cure for homosexu-
ality were something that could be administered - costlessly, risklessly, without side
effects - before a child had become aware of his homosexual propensity, you can be
sure that the child's parents would administer it to him, believing, probably correctly,
that he would be better off; not yet having assumed a homosexual identity.
POSNER, supra note 83, at 308.
100. As Eve Sedgwick writes,
To the degree - and it is significantly large - that the gay essentialist/constructivist
debate takes its form and premises from, and insistently refers to, a whole history of
other nature/nurture or nature/culture debates, it partakes of a tradition of viewing
culture as malleable relative to nature: that is, culture, unlike nature, is assumed to
be the thing that can be changed . . . . [Likewise, the feminist formulation has im-
plied] that the more fully gender inequality can be shown to inhere in human culture
rather than in biological nature, the more amenable it must be to alteration and re-
form . . . . I have often wondered what the basis was for our optimism about the
malleability of culture by any one group or program.
SEDGWlC, supra note 65, at 41.
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WEIGHT/LESSNESS & FUTURISTIC FANTASIES
There is a weight and weightlessness to lesbian identities.
One type of weight is based in history. As Jacquelyn Zita argues,
there is a "lacuna in postmodernist ontology and a failure to recognize
the individual's real powerlessness" against "the historical gravity of a
culturally constructed" body that "stubbornly returns with a weight that
defies the promises of postmodernist fantasy and its idealistic deni-
al." 01 The "weight" of lesbianism is as an historically disparaged and
prosecuted identity, an identity that can serve as a punitive legal refer-
ent even when the individual denies its applicability. Even among those
who argue that lesbian identity must be negotiable, the history of pros-
ecution and violence against lesbians requires that we live our lives"under a cloud of prior interpretation."' °2 Another type of weight is
based in perception and process, more phenomenological than a claim
to foundational reality. Lesbian identity is something I have known,
have felt, have recognized across a room and across years. It is the
river lesbian theorist and poet Gloria Anzaldfia utilizes to describe
identities: changing, yet perceptible, flowing.103
Yet another type of weight is based in community. Although I do
not posit lesbian identity as primarily forged in community, I do think
there has been an intellectual confluence of discovery and creation of
lesbian identities.' °4 This weight of our contemporary identities is
subject to continuing scrutinizing: "At this point in the history of lesbi-
an studies, it may be useful to step back from our 'cumulative dis-
coveries' and examine them as our 'collective constructions.'"1 °5
And finally, there is the weight of lesbian bodies, bodies in rela-
tion, in desire and -sex. °  As French lesbian theorist Mich~le Causse
101. Zita, supra note 45, at 126.
102. SHANE PHELAN, IDENTTY PoLTcs: LESBIAN FEMINISM AND THE LIMIaS OF COMMUNI-
TY 157, 170 (1989). Phelan argues that lesbian-feminism was too rigid and that if we are to be
"free, we must learn to embrace paradox and confusion." Id.
103. Anzaidda writes, "Identity is a river - a process. Contained within the river is its iden-
tity, and it needs to flow, to change to stay a river - if it stopped it would be a contained
body of water such as a lake or a pond." Gloria Anzaldda, To(o) Queer the Writer - Loca,
Escritora y Chicana, in INVERSIONS: WRmNGS BY DYKES, QUEERS AND LESBIANS 249, 253
(Betsy Warland ed., 1991).
104. Cf. HOAGLAND, supra note 47, at 290 (lesbian community as a ground of lesbian be-
ing).
105. Valerie Jenness, Coming Out: Lesbian Identities and the Categorization Problem, in
MODERN HOMOSEXUAuTIES 65, 73 (Ken Plummer ed., 1992).
106. For an elaboration of this weight, see Robson, Embodiments, supra note 2, at 39.
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describes it, "a face d face between two lesbians... between two
subjects who are constantly inventing themselves outside of any refer-
ence," lesbianism is a relation, a praxis.'O°
Paradoxically, perhaps, there is also a type of weightlessness to
lesbian identities. Lesbianism is most present as an absence. The term
"lesbian" itself is what one lesbian theorist describes as a "quadrifold
evasion," a term both weighty and weightless.1'8 As an intersection
between sexuality and gender, lesbian identity is often invisible."t 9
Much lesbian work has been an effort to instill gravity into the term
"lesbian."
It is against this weight/lessness that a lesbian Supreme Court
Justice becomes a worthwhile suggestion. A lesbian Supreme Court Jus-
tice remains rather unimaginable. A Justice weighted with the history of
lesbianism, with lesbian perception and process, with lesbian communi-
ty, with lesbian desire - it is. barely imaginable. A Justice existing in
contradiction to the weightlessness of lesbianism, its imperceptibility -
its unimaginability is precisely its attraction.
Yet the desire for a lesbian Supreme Court Justice also exhibits a
107. Use Weil, Conversation with Michle Causse, 20 TRIVIA: A JOURNAL OF IDEAS 90, 91
(1992).
108. Marilyn Frye explains:
The use of the word 'lesbian' to name us is a quadrifold evasion, a laminated
euphemism. To name us, one goes by way of a reference to the island of Lesbos,
which in turn is an indirect reference to the poet Sappho (who used to live there,
they say), which in turn is an indirect reference to what fragments of her poetry
have survived a few millennia of patriarchy, and this in turn (if we have not lost
you by now) is a propby!.ctic avoidance of direct mention of the sort of creature
who would write such poems or to whom such poems would be written . . . assum-
ing you happen to know what is in those poems written in a dialect of Greek over
two thousand five hundred years ago on some small island somewhere in the wine
dark Aegean Sea.
MARILYN FRYE THE POLITICS OF REALxFY: ESSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY 160 (1983) (ellipsis
in original).
109. The current trendiness of lesbians in the popular media might belie the continued via-
bility of notions of lesbian invisibility. For example, as Newsweek recently proclaimed, "Lesbi-
ans have always been the invisible homosexuals," but the cover story was not intended as
concealment. The Power and The Prid, NEWSWEEK, June 21, 1993, at 54 (cover story). How-
ever, as lesbian theorist Victoria Brownworth compellingly argues:
Many lesbians have been struggling for lesbian visibility for decades. But
visibility cannot be reduced to the Warholian 15 minutes under klieg lights. Visibility
comes over time, and it means permanent inclusivity, not a fad of the moment. The
Newsweek story treats lesbians as if they were fleeting: It diminishes our numbers to
less than 1% of the population and then fosters appalling misconceptions about who
we are and how we live. Beginning with a glossary of necessary lesbian terms
(butch, femme, lipstick lesbian, sex-positive, and vanilla), the story is sexist reduction-
ism at its worst . . . . The Newsweek story is the mainstream media version of a
lesbian photoplay in Playboy- momentary titillation, nothing more.
Victoria A. Brownworth, More Then Just a Trend; ADVoCATE, July 27, 1993, at 80.
458 ST. THOMAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
startling lack of imagination. This lack inheres in the problem of iden-
tity and identity' politics, embodied by a Radice-like Supreme Court
Justice who might not only be conservative, but also be strategically
used. But this lack'of imagination also inheres in the identities - social-
ly constructed - of those of us who are imagining. It is this construc-
tion that makes it difficult for us to imagine the most radical changes,
changes that are not merely inserting lesbian interests into the existing
structure. Imaginings that do not take for granted a Supreme Court, or
even a constitutional system, or even the "rule of law". It is risk of
such imaginings that are the challenge of lesbian legal theory beyond
the 1990s.
